The 10th Mountain Division

A historical account of one of World War II’s most famed military units

The 10th Mountain Division is one of World War II’s most famed military units. During the war, America’s experiment with mountain troops was portrayed as a rugged group of men, training to fight the forces of fascism in the most difficult conditions and terrain, prepared to fight for glory on the highest peaks and steepest slopes. Such an idea is even encapsulated in the Division’s motto, “Climb to Glory.” As the years passed, however, the historians began to look back, wondering if the impacts of the 10th Mountain Division were really as profound as the American public remembers. While some attack the Division’s inefficiencies and others call out what they believe to be failures in their training, an examination of the entire story of the Division is necessary to truly examine if the 10th Mountain Division lives up to its reputation as an elite mountain force.

The year is 1940 and Russia is four months into their invasion of Finland. Despite being a much smaller force, the Finnish war strategy gave them the upper hand on a Russian force that vastly outnumbered them. These tactics took advantage of the Finnish winter landscape, such as snowy forests and frozen canals. The Russians stayed on the main roads making them easy targets for the Finns who would swiftly escape on cross-country skis or ice skates after a surprise attack on the enemy. Superior training and tactics allowed the Finns to overwhelm their enemy, however, at the time such a unit had never existed in the United States Army throughout its 189-year existence.

Although skiing was a relatively new sport in America, as recreational skiing began to gain traction during the interwar period, Europe had long traditions of skiing and mountaineering. Furthermore, European countries had centuries of experience fighting in one another’s mountains and the likely enemy of the Americans, Germany, already had three mountain divisions. Winter warfare was not unknown to North America, however, as during the French and Indian Wars colonial troops used snowshoes in the Champlain Valley to fight Native Americans. Despite this history, the United States had never truly fought a winter war because while some wars did happen during the winter, the U.S. Army never created a full military unit dedicated to winter combat.

One man who took notice of America’s negligence in creating mountain troops was Minnie Dole, the head of the National Ski Patrol (NSP), later known as the National Ski Patrol System (NSPS). The NSP was a civilian organization that certified ski patrollers to patrol mountains throughout the country, but mostly the East Coast at its inception. Dole initially approached members of NSP in the spring of 1940, asking them if they would like to offer their services to the War Department. At this time the United States was not directly involved in the European or Pacific theater, however, they were indirectly involved as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced the Land Lease Policy in which the United States would supply Great Britain with necessary supplies, indirectly fighting Hitler and the Nazis. The members responded with a resounding 90% in favor of helping the War Department. Dole then wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson to inform him of the NSP’s offer. When the Army Chief of Staff wrote back to Dole he “thanked the ski club for its ‘patriotic motive’’ and said that the Army would appreciate “informal advice and assistance in the technique and skiing and the purchase of equipment.” As historian McKay Jenkins put it in his 2003 book The Last Ridge, the Army seemed to hope that the “Eccentrics from New England would go away.”

Dole was not deterred, however, and continued to barrage the military with letters, attempting to convince them that they were unprepared for mountain warfare, as Generals were adamant about taking their troops to the South for the winter. He gathered information about European ski troops, such as the German Alpenkorps, active during World War I, the French Chasseurs Alpin, formed in 1888, or the Italian Alpini troops, the oldest mountain division in the world, founded in 1872. However, when Dole finally landed a meeting with Army Chief of Staff, George Marshal, he decided to focus on the possible necessity for a mountain division for national defense, instead of the successes of troops abroad. He argued that if the Germans ever launched an attack on the United States they easily could move down the Saint Lawrence River, and through the Champlain Valley. The best way to stop the advancing Germans would come through an occupation of the high ground in the Adirondacks, but without mountain troops, it would be near impossible for the Army to pull off such a defensive maneuver.

Minnie Dole and the National Ski Patrol System was not the only organization that recognized the military’s inadequacies in regard to mountain warfare. The American Alpine Club (AAC), a mountaineering club, met in December of 1940 to discuss ways in which they could help the army test gear for mountain warfare. The AAC quickly realized, as Jenkins states, “the American military establishment was profoundly ignorant about mountain warfare.” Understanding the inherent danger of ignorance in the mountains, the AAC quickly set about remedying this situation by translating many European mountaineering manuals, cataloging equipment, and training techniques, while also pointing out the differences in how the Americans and Europeans would defend their mountains.

The AAC also knew that the proper equipment could mean the difference between life and death in the mountains, so the Club put extensive time and effort into researching proper gear for a military mountain unit. They found that multiple layers preserved body heat better than one large layer, and that standard GI sleeping bags and winter clothing were almost dangerous to be wearing in the high mountains. The Alpine Club also found new standards for boots, sleeping bags, tents, gas cooking sets, and sunscreen. They also discovered that crampons, toothy cleats that attach to the bottom of boots, would be necessary for crossing ice, while ice axes were useful for cutting steps, serving as walking sticks, and belaying climbers. The new equipment was then put to the test on an expedition to Alaska, led by Bob Bates and Walter Wood. Army officials even agreed to drop supplies from B-15 bombers, as they were eager to see the equipment in action.

Now that the Army had the necessary equipment, the AAC and the NSP continued the argument that it would be useless if the new equipment was given to a group of soldiers who had never skied before. They believed that they needed a group of men already highly trained and skilled in the field of skiing, mountaineering, and surviving in the hostile environment of the mountains.

Despite the arguments of both organizations, one man was standing in the way of the creation of a mountain unit, Lieutenant General Leslie James McNair. He believed that Army resources had already been stretched thin and a unit relying on mules for transportation would have no effect on a highly mechanized German military. As Justin J. Chabalko quoted in his work, The Art of War Papers, McNair believed “that in general, [specialized troops’] priority is below both expansion and sound general training and that such special training should be minimized”. He further claimed that “a unit that relied on mules for transportation seemed almost quaint in an era of highly mechanized German units.” Later word came from the US military attaché in Italy that the Italian army had been driven back by a Greek counterattack because the Italians were not ready for either winter or fighting in the mountains, and the result was twenty-five thousand soldiers killed, ten thousand of which mearly froze to death. After hearing this information, Dole intensified his lobbying efforts, but the military continued to believe that what they needed was troops that could fight anywhere, not specialized troops to fight in a specific mode of terrain. Dole eventually defeated this ideology after he sent letters to the President, the Secretary of War, and the Army Chief of Staff, informing them that Germany had created some of the best mountain soldiers over the past four years, while American troops were trained largely in the Deep South and had no exposure to any mountainous or wintery terrain. Finally, Dole’s argument won over the military establishment and on November 15, 1941, the 87th Mountain Infantry would be activated at Fort Lewis, Washington. At the time of the creation of the 87th, the Germans controlled approximately one million, nine-hundred thousand square kilometers, and another eight-hundred and one thousand square kilometers were controlled by Germany’s European allies. To the east the Japanese were in control of China and had invaded British Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies, however, the United States still had not entered the war.

The first step for creating mountain troops was finding men to fill its ranks. For the first time in the history of the United States of America, the Army relied on a civilian organization to recruit men. This job fell to Minnie Dole and the NSP as they scoured the country for men fit to fill the ranks of the new mountain division. Eventually, Dole and his assistants recruited 7,000 men to enlist in the ski troops, many of whom were European and American skiing celebrities. The Army also called for the help of the AAC to recruit mountainers because there were not many experienced mountaineers throughout the country.

As new recruits flooded into Camp Lewis, it became clear that the officers had little to no idea about anything related to the mountains, much less how to train men in the high country. The Army appointed Lieutenant Colonel Onslow Rolfe to command the 87th, but the best that the military could do to justify this appointment to the post was that he had hiked in Central America during summer leave. Later, Rolfe was found to be unfit to run a mountain division as he was relieved of his position in 1943. Despite officer inadequacies, the Mountain Troops learned everything from basic ski turns to advanced rope techniques during their time at Camp Lewis. Ski school lasted for eight weeks during the winter, six days a week and six hours a day. When the snow melted the men went through a five-day mountaineering school to prepare them for the mountains they would have to climb in combat. Because of their long and arduous training, the 87th Mountain Infantry began to wonder by September 1942 when the training would stop and the fighting would begin. Despite their lowering morale as there seemed to be no end in sight of the endless “idiotic” day-long hikes, the 87th was preparing to move to Colorado for further training.

During the summer of 1942, a small troop of the 87th was also sent to the Canadian Rockies for a secret mission to test over-snow vehicles for a group of paratroopers to use in a mission to blow up a Norwegian heavy water plant that the Allies suspected the Germans were using to create atomic weapons. The 87th eventually settled on a model that would fit the specifications necessary, but they were not slated to take part in the Norwegian operation, leading to further frustrations because they were taking part in more and more training but that training was not being put to use on the front lines. Before the over-snow vehicles could be used, however, commandos from the Norwegian resistance snuck into the plant and detonated a series of explosives that destroyed its usefulness to the enemy.

Finally, in the summer of 1942, the entire 87th Mountain Infantry moved to Camp Hale, Colorado near the tiny town of Pando and what would one day become the famous resort of Vail. The mountains around the camp were ideal for ski training, complete with a tow rope on the primary training hill for the most efficient training. Recruits such as Herbert Schneider, who was a famous instructor who had taught thousands in Austria, or former Austrian junior champion Toni Matt continued piling into Camp Hale attracting even more media attention towards the Division which certainly helped with Minnie Dole’s new assignment, finding 2,500 new mountain troopers. It was also at Camp Hale that the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment was redesignated the 10th Mountain Division.

Throughout their time at Camp Hale and especially during the winter of 1943, the troops were subjected to various tests of their gear and own ability. Some were sent to live for two weeks at 13,000 feet while eating only dried cacao powder and pemmican, a high-calorie mixture of tallow, dried meat, and sometimes dried berries. Another test of the men’s skills and endurance was the Homestake Maneuvers. The men were not sure what the purpose of the maneuver was, but it was assumed that their superiors were only trying to see how much bad weather the troops could take. These maneuvers went terribly as many men were not acclimated to the altitude and found that the pace that officers tried to have the troops keep, 106 steps per minute, was impossible to maintain at such an altitude. Furthermore, many troops were not trained in basic winter survival, such as the use of outdoor stoves or protecting themselves from the elements. As a result of these failures, the commanding officer, Colonel Rolfe, was fired and the position of commanding officer was given to Brigadier General Lloyd Jones.

As word spread of the Division’s hardships and tests in the high country, they became media darlings resulting in many articles being written about them. They began to be called the toughest of all men. Even a Warner Brothers movie was made about them, called Mountain Fighters, which came out on August 7th, 1943. The movie showcased a fictitious ending where they fight and defeat a much larger German force. Through it all, however, some members of the mountain troops hated the media attention as much of it was “bunk”. They wondered if the Army actually wanted them to fight or just be stooges for Hollywood while American troops were being pushed all over the African Continent during Operation Torch. Despite the soldiers’ complaints about their spot in the public eye, the publicity was undeniably working as troops continued to pile into Camp Hale.

As the fighting in Italy began to ramp up the War Department transferred members of the original 87th Infantry out of Camp Hale to flatland dutty while bringing in new troops from the Deep South and Hawaii, most of whom had never seen snow. The morale of the 10th was plummeting as they were stuck on the sidelines as General Mark Clark and the U.S. 5th Army were fighting in the Italian mountains near the town of Cassino, Italy, making a push to Rome during the winter of 1944. Jenkins claims that the men of the 10th were wondering why they were not taking part in the Italian campaign when they had been specially trained for the kind of combat the 5th Army was engaging in. Furthermore, the Allies suffered fifty-two thousand casualties compared to the Germans’ thirty-eight thousand. General Marshal later claimed that the war in Italy could have been advanced in Cassino if the Mountain Troops had been there. As a result of these increasing casualties, Jenkins claims, the opposition to the Italian campaign began to grow.

Then in March and April of 1944, the D-Series took place which was one of the most grueling training exercises in American military history. Troops were ordered to carry 90-pound packs to 13,000 feet through temperatures that stayed well below zero throughout the D-Series, while storms dumped eight feet of snow. To make sure the failures of the Homestake Maneuvers were not repeated, however, all men were properly outfitted and it was required for men to change their socks and insoles each night. During the D-Series, the men were pushed to their absolute limits as officers pushed them to unsustainable rates. Finally when the dust settled the D-Series was labeled as a failure by none other than Minnie Dole himself because of the number of men that acquired a sickness as a result of the D-Series and the fact that only forty percent of personnel that took part in the D-Series were qualified for such training.

Then on June 20, 1944, the Army made a surprising change to the 10th’s training, shipping them off to Camp Swift, Texas to prepare for swamp maneuvers in Louisiana, which the Army deemed necessary. “Alpine” was even removed from the Division’s name. Jenkins states in The Last Ridge that the men were infuriated, especially because of the misery that the Allies were facing in the mountains of Italy as they worked to push the Germans back up the Italian Peninsula. Camp Swift was hot and miserable for these mountain men and while the 10th was in Texas, the Army decided to add heavy weapons, drastically altering the Division from its original state of a light division to include large, water-cooled machine guns. Men were also told to send their families home and were issued new gear, an indication that they were soon going to finally be shipped overseas. The Division also received a new commanding officer in November. The man who got the job was General George P. Hays who served in World War I as an artillery lieutenant, an artillery commander at Cassino during the Italian Campaign of World War II, and landed at Omaha Beach. On November 29, 1944, the troops boarded a train bound for Newport News, Virginia and although they didn’t know it, they were headed for Italy, arriving not as the 10th Light Division but as the 10th Mountain Division.