Making Sense of Gen Z Politics: How Young America Thinks

Why the traditional Left-Right spectrum no Longer explains Gen Z

Photo by Kelly Sikkema on Unsplash

PEW Research Center recently published an article defining several new political ideologies that help explain the complexities of our current electorate. I found it compelling, but vague and unclear. However, PEW’s motivation to create this new ideological map is justified. The fact is, America in 2026 does not have the same ideologies it once did. This is especially true among young people. As a young person myself, I’d like to explain some of the new ideologies, or political groupings, that I’ve seen among my peers. In doing so, I do not intend to advocate for or support any specific worldview. I am simply trying to explain a political landscape that feels extremely foreign to most adults. The following will be purely based on my perceptions and observation of the world around me.

In a recent book, Dr. Steve Davies theorizes that the divide between left and right is no longer primarily drawn along economic differences, but rather differences in national identity. I agree, and this change is especially noticeable with young people.

Here is what I’ve observed:

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The populist, anti-establishment far-right

The young far-right doesn’t necessarily believe in free markets, low regulations, low taxes, and an interventionist U.S. foreign policy. Rather, its beliefs are explicitly focused on maintaining what is, in its view, America’s national identity and sovereignty. First and foremost, the new far-right is very opposed to immigration. This is a sharp departure from the old Reagan Republicans, who in many cases welcomed immigrants and saw their economic value in society. This camp of new voters feels as though an influx of people from different cultures, religions, and backgrounds will chip away at the culture they hold near and dear to their hearts. To them, the legality of the immigration is of little relevance. Rather, they reject it in its entirety, legal or illegal. In their view, if America is everyone and everything, every language, every culture, every people, then it is nothing.

This anti-immigration sentiment is coupled with a broader distrust of U.S. intervention abroad: many in this coalition don’t see how the billions of dollars spent on war and regime change throughout the 20th and 21st centuries have materially benefited their lives. Many of these young voters are skeptical of the billions of dollars sent to Ukraine, which they feel is an example of this phenomenon. In recent years, the far-right populist movement has also been very critical of the U.S. military and political relationship with Israel. On top of rejecting it for isolationist reasons, it also fears the influence of Israeli interests in government, most notably AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee). In its view, the years of steadfast U.S. support for Israel is largely a result of Israeli lobbying, and thus it distrusts politicians who express strong support for it. On economics, this faction diverges from the GOP establishment again. Many of its members harbor intense resentment towards the American financial elite, sometimes exacerbated by the infamous Epstein Files, which in their view highlighted the ways in which institutions protected the wealthiest people in America from proper consequences. Many would support what is traditionally seen as a left-wing view of higher taxes on billionaires and the corporate elite. Similarly, members of this camp distrust large technology and media corporations, as fears of AI and political bias loom large.

An important note: many in this group are explicitly anti-Trump. I think most mainstream media misses that. Due to the Trump Administration’s handling of the Epstein Files, its foreign involvement in Venezuela and Iran, and its close ties to big tech, many of these far-right populists have abandoned Trump. The Atlantic recently did an article which tells a similar story. In an analysis of young Republican men, they found that “most of the men … said that the president is abandoning his “America First” agenda, which is what attracted them to the Republican Party in the first place” (Sabgir). They feel that Trump’s foreign interventions in Venezuela and Iran directly contradict his “no new wars” message on the campaign trail, and thus feel betrayed. It is however important to recognize that there are a variety of different worldviews in this coalition, and they are not all the same. This is my attempt to paint a general picture of this ideological category.

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The Progressive Left

Interestingly, the new progressives on the left share many similarities with the anti-establishment populists on the right. The skepticism of interventionism, hostility towards AIPAC, and resentment of the financial elite are all true for the progressives, too. Of course, they are also very different, and they too have their own idiosyncrasies. On economics, some explicitly reject capitalism in its entirety. A recent survey from Gallup found that around 66% of Democrats have a favorable view of socialism, higher than the number who support capitalism. This is a result of a broader lack of economic success, which is attributed to the failure of the U.S. economic system as a whole. It is harder than ever to buy a house. The job market is brutal. At the end of the day, many believe that the lives their parents and grandparents enjoyed are no longer achievable. That, along with the rise in wealth inequality, has made some young leftists simply reject capitalism. Because of this dynamic, many of these young progressives harbor intense anger towards the nation’s wealthiest. They feel that the intense wealth disparity cannot possibly be just: the support for billionaire or wealth taxes is strongest among this group.

There are also a number of social issues that often correlate strongly with this ideology. For example, a more fluid view of gender and sexuality is common within this camp, as well as more progressive views on race and religion. For instance, young progressives are still very supportive of affirmative action geared towards making universities more diverse and equitable. Protecting abortion is almost a given, especially for young women.

Here’s an interesting and fascinating twist: A lot of young people within these first two groups (in special cases) may actually support the same candidates. Thomas Massie, the Congressman from Kentucky, is a good example. Massie is a libertarian, but recently has become an intense and public critic of the Trump Administration, specifically with regard to the Epstein Files and the Iran/Israel war. He has made the case that the U.S. has first been complicit in protecting a class of ultra-wealthy criminals, while simultaneously making the same mistake that it had in Iraq, and Vietnam before that. This message appeals to both the young far-right and the young far-left. Their main divergence really comes from cultural beliefs, where the populist far-right group is still quite traditionally conservative on issues such as feminism and sexuality, while the new progressives are, in fact, still progressive. Another key divergence from the far-right populists stems from immigration. This progressive camp is pro-immigration, and is quite skeptical of anti-immigration nativism on racial lines. Politicians such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez, and Zohran Mamdani are very popular in this group. The Democratic establishment, however, is quite unpopular. They are seen as being weak and ineffective against the Trump Administration, and seem unable to articulate an agenda that is anything other than being anti-Trump. This is why farther left candidates, who do have their own ideas irrespective of Trump, are more appealing.

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The more traditional young conservatives

There is still a more establishment coalition on the young right, and it is quite prominent. This group’s ideology most notably reflects that of the late political activist Charlie Kirk. It is against DEI, which has made a big impact on young people’s political views due to its large presence in schools, social media, and the workplace. Most of these traditional conservatives support low immigration and tax cuts, but (unlike their Reagan Republican predecessors) their cultural opinions, rather than economic views, seem to be the primary motivation for their political stances. This group, like the anti-establishment movement, really seems to latch on to preserving what it perceives as traditional American culture. Country music, for example, has become very popular and (anecdotally) sometimes feels like a subtle political message about the desire for a simpler, more traditionally American life. A recent study by Cornell University confirms the overlap between country music and conservatism (Liaukonytė, Winkler, Wlömert). Similar to the populists again, for these young conservatives, Christianity will often play a big role in their identities and political views, too. Pro-life sentiment on religious grounds is a very common sentiment among both of these groups. Many are religious, and hope one day, first and foremost, to start a family and have children.

However, this faction’s politics diverge from the new far-right in several key ways, and more closely resembles the old GOP. For instance, many traditional young conservatives are still in favor of legal immigration, while the populists to their right often reject migration writ large. This is probably the biggest difference. Their view of foreign engagement is also different. The traditional right is generally more in favor of U.S. interventionism, and is much less skeptical (and often supportive) of America’s political relationship with Israel. The divide between these two groups on the right can also be seen clearly through their preferred political activists. Tucker Carlson and Nick Fuentes dominate much of the young populist movement, whose messaging is more conspiratorial and radical. In contrast, Kirk and Ben Shapiro are more popular with this coalition, who generally place a greater emphasis on debate and civil discourse. Unlike the populist right, the traditionalists are still much more supportive of the Trump Administration, though support for it has fallen among young people drastically. Recently, a Yale Youth Poll found that “both men ages 23-29 and 30-34 shifted 14 points towards Democrats” since 2025. Politicians like Marco Rubio, Ron Desantis, and the up and coming Brandon Gill appeal to these new voters more than Thomas Massie or Tucker Carlson.

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The less engaged majority

A lot of young people who are less interested in politics do not have strong political opinions yet. Rather, they just hate what they’re seeing on social media. They hate the divisive rhetoric of the Trump Administration. They hate political violence. They feel that ICE’s handling of immigration has gone too far, as many hold a relatively moderate stance on immigration. In general, they hate seeing politics in the news so much and want a return to what they consider to be normalcy. In 2028, this is where candidates have a real opportunity with the youth. If a charismatic, ideally young politician is able to effectively articulate his or her views without coming off as divisive or harsh, they will surely win over a large number of young voters in this group, whose opinions about taxation, foreign policy, and immigration are not as strong. Many of my peers have grown up in a political age unlike any other, where political extremism and violent rhetoric feels culturally embedded rather than a temporal anomaly. If they were shown, for instance, the 2012 Presidential debate between President Obama and Governor Romney, they’d be shocked but pleasantly surprised by the level of civility shown by both sides.

We must, of course, leave room for nuance. Not every young American falls into one of these factions perfectly. In reality, just like before, most people have a wide range of beliefs that dip into various ideologies. These are not the only ideological camps that exist for young voters. However, these political groupings are new, and thus important to understand in a political landscape that is increasingly dangerous and consequential. Although young people do not vote as consistently as older voters, Gen Z will be the future of the country in a few years time, so politicians should start to learn how to appeal to them.

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